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ABSTRACT 
 
During early phase spacecraft design, the concurrent engineering (CE) approach is proven to be very efficient. 
But the condensed and iterative nature of CE sessions can also make life hard for a cost estimator. This work 
discusses 13 problem areas experienced or observed mainly during one-week, inter-disciplinary space system 
design studies and provides practical examples on how to tackle them, e.g. how to handle rapid data changes, 
wrong expectations and a diverse engineering team. 
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ACRONYMS 
CAD Computer-aided Design 
CE Concurrent Engineering 
CEF Concurrent Engineering Facility 
CER Cost Estimation Relationship 
DMM Design Maturity Margin 
MBSE Model-based System Engineering 
P/L Payload 
ROM Rough order of Magnitude 
SSCM Small Satellite Cost Model 
S/C Spacecraft 
S/S Subsystem 
WBS Work Breakdown Structure 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Concurrent Engineering (CE) is an efficient Systems 
Engineering (SE) approach which is increasingly 
applied in early phase spacecraft design due to the 
involvement of all relevant disciplines, including the 
customer, often supported by data models and tools as 
well as a communication fostering infrastructure.  
 
During several moderated sessions, the latest results 
and problems are shared with the entire team which 
supports the convergence towards a common solution. 
This exchanged information is a key input for the cost 
estimator and provides guidance on what to further 
discuss, research, or how cost models should be used or 
adapted. But the data is constantly changing due to the 
iterative approach. Moreover, the space sector is not 
famous for public data, making research and 
comparisons often difficult. With predominantly 
technical people in the room the cost estimate may also 
be perceived disconnected.  
Based on the study context, managers expect either 
ROM cost or a detailed WBS-like breakdown. These 
and other reasons why cost estimation could go in the 
wrong direction are discussed within the paper, based 
on experience and observations related to systems, 
concurrent and cost engineering. It includes real-world 
examples, ideas for solutions and some anecdotes 
which shall round off this lesson learnt compilation. 
 
This paper has been prepared to discuss and raise 
awareness about stumbling stones which can be 
encountered particularly significant during otherwise 
very efficient and recommendable Concurrent 
Engineering  (here so-called “CE-studies”) activities 
for space missions and system in the early phase, using 
the DLR CE-approach as an example. 
 
The potential problems arising are not exclusively for 
CE nor for the cost domain. As for CE in general, the 
approach for Cost Engineering in such an environment 
varies amongst different institutions. This relates to 
tools, data available, time available and likely even the 
objectives and expected outcomes. 
This work is based on experiences and observations 
gathered during several DLR CE-studies during which 
one particular approach is applied but also common 
rules and practices are followed. 
 
  
2
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING AT DLR 
The German Aerospace Center (DLR) is the national 
aeronautics and space research center. It performs 
extensive research and development (R&D) activities 
related to aeronautics, space, energy, transport, security 
and digitalization. Furthermore DLR contains the 
German Space Administration, acting on behalf of the 
Federal Government, which is responsible for the 
implementation of Germany’s Space Program, on 
national and international level.  In 2007 the Institute 
of Space Systems was inaugurated within the Space 
R&D branch, with the objective to perform analysis, 
design, development, testing, integration and 
management of space systems, including e.g. satellites, 
probes, habitats and launch vehicles.  
In order to conduct efficient feasibility and preliminary 
design studies for internal and external missions and 
systems, the DLR Concurrent Engineering Facility 
(CEF), which is shown in Figure 1 below, has been 
established as part of the Institute build-up [1]. 
 
According to a definition from the European Space 
Agency (ESA), Concurrent Engineering is a  
“..systematic approach to integrated product 
development that emphasizes the response to 
customer expectations. It embodies team values 
of co-operation, trust and sharing in such a 
manner that decision making is by consensus, 
involving all perspectives in parallel, from the 
beginning of the product life-cycle” [2] 
 
The major elements of CE as it is applied in the space 
sector are a guided and structure process, an 
infrastructure which fosters communication, 
collaborative and concurrent working, a central data 
model to enable instant and simultaneous data 
exchange, as well as a team representing all relevant 
disciplines, including the customer [3].  
 
 
Figure 1: DLR Concurrent Engineering Facility 
CE in Space has been applied already in the U.S. for 
more than 20 years, initially by the Aerospace 
Corporation and NASA’s Team-X, and also at ESA 
since 1998. It clearly proved the efficiency and high 
quality for early space system and mission studies. 
Nowadays many international organizations apply this 
approach as part of their Systems Engineering activities 
in one way or another. These organizations include 
agencies (e.g. NASA, ESA, JAXA, CNES, ASI, DLR), 
system integrators (e.g. Airbus, TAS, OHB), private or 
governmental organizations (e.g. Aerospace, Ball, 
NRO) and universities (e.g. MIT Boston, Utah State 
University, Skoltech Moscow, ISU Strasbourg, EPFL 
Lausanne, UPM Madrid, UNSW Canberra) [3]. More 
details on the general CE-approach and existing 
facilities can be found for example in [1], [2] and [3]. 
 
With initial support of the ESA Concurrent Design 
Facility (CDF) team, the DLR CEF adapted the 
Concurrent Engineering process and all related 
elements such as the actual infrastructure, required data 
models and software tools and also the team (wrt. size, 
compilation) to their own needs. With currently more 
than 70 studies completed, the CE-process is already 
well established but also continuously improving due 
to the on-going challenges of new customers, study 
topics, support technologies or team members. 
 
Whereas the overall study timeline including initiation, 
preparation and also post-processing phases can last 
several weeks, the actual CE-study phase at DLR 
typically lasts one full week [4]. Figure 2 shows the 
overall timeline including the different parties involved 
and information products generated, and Figure 3 
presents a typical schedule for the actual 1-week study 
phase. During this phase a mixture of moderated 
(indicated in red) and non-moderated sessions (blue) 
take place, in which either general and system-relevant, 
or more specific trades and tasks are perform 
respectively.  
 
Figure 2: DLR CE-study overall timelime 
 
Figure 3: DLR-CE study phase schedule (1 week) 
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As a different example, ESA organizes their sessions 
over several weeks with only one or two moderated 
sessions per week [2], while Team-X at NASA Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) also compresses the study 
sessions into less than one week, as indicated amongst 
others in [5]. 
A common set of domains and their representatives 
covers the moderator, the customer, Science/Payload 
Engineering, Systems Engineering, Mission Analysis, 
subject matter expertise for Structure, Thermal, Power, 
C&DH, TT&C, AOCS and Propulsion, 3D- 
Accommodation/Configuration engineering, Mission 
Operations, Risk/Product Assurance and also a Cost 
Engineering/Analysis. 
 
In summary, at DLR, during the preparation phase, the 
CE-study organizers distribute a study scope document 
to the entire team for preparation. In the beginning of 
the actual study week, when everybody comes together 
in the CEF, the key information is presented again to 
the team. Afterwards, the discussions and work starts 
immediately for instance with initial discussions on the 
impact of the top-level requirements towards the 
mission and system design, with initial definitions of 
the product tree, preliminary subsystem sizing and 
operational modes. That is when the fun part for all 
participants including the cost estimators begins… 
 
COST ESTIMATION IN CE ENVIRONMENT 
In not so serious terms, try to imagine you have a 
counter with 32 hours (i.e. 4 labour days with 8 hours 
working time each) counting backwards on your desk 
(which is not your daily one), approximately 20 people 
around you (thereof at least 15 technical experts) in one 
single room, a challenging mission statement displayed 
on the screen, and you are the only one person who is 
interested in things like fiscal year or full accounting 
cost. If you manage to do so, you have understood cost 
engineering within a CE environment in a nutshell. 
 
In more serious terms, depending of course on the level 
of preparation, time or the experience and approach of 
the cost estimator, a typical set of activities during such 
kind of CE-study looks like this: 
 Gather project-related data to establish technical 
and programmatic baseline, 
 identify similar missions (if data available) and 
derive analogy-based specific ROM cost values as 
starting point, 
 check what methods and tools should be further 
used and discuss this with project manager and 
customer, 
 use available data, perform estimates, iterate as the 
data becomes more mature, 
 support the technical team and managers with cost 
expertise during system trades, 
 compare and x-check estimates amongst different 
methodologies and tools, if possible, and 
 identify and present what cost have been elaborated 
in detail and which are estimated with more simple 
rules of thumbs, or even have not been included. 
 
Figure 4: GUI of DLR ‘Virtual Satellite’ data model 
 
Methods and tools used in the CEF cover amongst 
others parametric estimations using the Small Satellite 
Cost Model 2014 (SSCM14), SEER-Space, TransCost, 
SMAD-CERs, own Excel tools, the T1 Equivalent 
Units approach [6] and formerly also the USCM. 
Central data models used at DLR include mainly the 
Virtual Satellite (VirSat), shown in Figure 4 but also 
the ESA Open Concurrent Design Tool (OCDT) and 
the former Integrated Design Model (IDM) workbooks 
as complementary and optional models [7]. 
 
13 REASONS WHY… 
In the following, the 13 selected reasons (or problem 
areas) why a cost estimate during a Concurrent 
Engineering Study could go wrong are discussed. For 
sure, there are plenty of others ones who could lead to 
tough work or even wrong results, but these are most 
prominent ones according to the author’s experience.  
Moreover, most of them are intertwined and also not 
exclusively applicable during CE-studies but also in 
any other cost estimation activity, some are even very 
obvious, but these selected reasons may increase the 
level of impact when they come true. 
 
For each of the aspects, there are some ideas, lessons 
learnt or recommendations provided on how problems 
could be reduced or even avoided. 
Wrong Expectations (#1) 
Customers in a CE-study at DLR come from totally 
different areas. They could be project managers, 
department/group/directorate heads in charge of a 
space program, or Principal Investigators and science 
teams, both internal and external. Depending on the 
type and number of stakeholders, their background and 
interests as well as their expectations with respect to 
the cost estimation results may extremely vary from 
study to study but also amongst the estimator and the 
customer within one particular study.  
 
The CE-approach is very suitable for early design 
activities, hence these multi-disciplinary studies take 
place most often in Phase 0 or A of a project.  
This results in a certain granularity of the estimate, 
with cost usually presented on segment or subsystem 
level.  
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Figure 5: Random example of tailoring the NASA cost 
estimating process, adapted from [8] 
 
However, often it is expected to provide a bottom-up 
estimate on work package level showing also labour 
cost, material cost or facility and operational cost (see 
also problem area #11). Other customers rather want to 
see a split between development (NRE) and production 
(RE) cost.  
 
Most of them expect the results (without knowing them 
in advance of course) to meet their available budget, 
which is often fix and constant per year, within the 
available time. Basically all customers want to get a 
single, final number at the end of week which they can 
take home and which is rarely considered a subject for 
further correction or increase.  
The level of detail which is expected is often not in-
line with the time available to provide the results, nor is 
it in-line with what you think should and could be done 
at this early stage. Moreover, it might not be 
understood that even the tools which are at hand can 
barely be applied to all of the missions, particularly for 
new designs. 
 
To avoid bad surprises at the end, the cost estimator 
needs to iterate with the study leader and customer the 
expectations already during the preparation phase, i.e. 
prior to the first study session. Part of such discussion 
should be how the standard cost estimation process, as 
described e.g. in [8] and shown in Figure 5, can be 
tailored and what the possible and most relevant cost 
breakdown might be, for instance if rather production 
and development cost need to be distinguished, System 
and S/S effort, labour and materials, investments and 
facilities, or if the space segment cost is more 
interesting than the operations cost, or vice versa. 
These discussions support the decision which methods 
and tools could be an option for the estimator, and the 
identification on how the final format for the 
representation of the cost can be set up in a most 
suitable way. 
International and multi-disciplinary Team (#2)  
The CE-study team is not only multi-disciplinary but 
also very international, particular in European entities 
such as ESA or DLR. Various nationalities are working 
together in one room, which brings in different 
cultures, different ways of thinking, working and 
communication, as well as different languages and 
levels of English. This is a very powerful basis to boost 
creativity and it also provides a vast range of 
knowledge due to the different educational 
backgrounds and maybe previous international 
company experiences. On the other hand, for a one-
week CE-study this compiled team has to be 
harmonized somehow, which is a challenge for all 
domains and subject matter experts (and not only cost). 
 
In addition to the team working on the design within 
the CEF, if the CE-study is part of a bid preparation, 
the potential industry consortium which is planned for 
implementation may significantly affect the labour rate 
or productivity assumptions which have to be taken 
into account. This is true for parametric and other 
estimation methodologies.  
 
During one study there was for instance an external 
systems engineer from Greece who considered the 
involvement of Greek institutions for building a set of 
CubeSats. Although the currency might be the same 
(here: EURO), the labour rates can be completely 
different when comparing e.g. northern with southern 
European countries. I this study case it was required to 
decide which work packages (or Subsystems) should 
be assessed with a rate of around 200 k€ per work-year 
and which ones with around 100 k€. 
 
Prior to the study, even if not a single detail is available 
for the technical baseline, a cost-internal stakeholder 
analysis should be performed, which covers all aspects 
for dealing with the different team members and maybe 
their different attitude in terms of supporting a cost 
estimate, and also how different international 
contributions for the mission could affect the 
estimation process and what elements (e.g. labour) 
might need adjustments. This exercise last only 
minutes but can save a lot of time, hassle and last 
minute corrections during the study sessions. 
Tools not available or applicable (#3) 
Concurrent Engineering follows an iterative approach, 
which requires rapid assessments and analyses, quick 
engineering tools, intensive communication, the ability 
to think out of the box but also a systematic way of 
performing the tasks as much in parallel as it could be. 
But space missions are often characterized by unique 
designs. Space system cost and also technical data is 
barely available, especially if the own company does 
not have a large record of building space systems itself.  
The time do develop dedicated CERs, maybe even 
based on the poor data set, is simply not given during a 
CE-study (see also #7 and #8) therefore the remaining 
solution is typically to use an already established tool 
which supports the estimate with historical, underlying 
data and CERs gathered and developed by others, and 
which are not visible for the end user.  
 
There are some tools out there which are accessible for 
everyone on no cost. In many cases they cover a 
special mission or system type, for example the Small 
Satellite Cost Model (SSCM) [9], which covers the S/C 
bus cost, roughly in the 100-1000 kg range.  
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More detailed or more powerful tools can be in-house 
developments (such as several NASA ones) or 
commercially available. Unfortunately, not all 
institutions are able to afford commercial tools or to 
invest in internal developments.  
 
However, sometimes the space mission to be designed 
and analyzed is so fancy or special that even no tool is 
applicable. This leads to a lot of ‘modelling’ during the 
dense set of CE-sessions by the cost estimator, which is 
already challenging. By using as a starting point for 
instance the mentioned freely available CERs and tools 
(e.g. SSCM, USCM, NASA PCEC) or analogy-based, 
specific ROM cost factors from former missions for the 
basis of estimate (BoE), still a lot of adjustments have 
to be made. Most cost data is captured in US$ for 
instance and might force the estimator to adjust the 
results to the required currency, such as € in Europe.  
 
The question remains which inflation scheme should be 
applied, the NASA inflation index, European annual 
average inflation or the national one (German, in the 
DLR case)? Compared to the overall uncertainties, 
especially for the very specific space missions such 
aspects could potentially be neglected.  
Furthermore the desired cost breakdown is not fully 
possible, or the tools/CERs do not capture the latest 
technologies, or some parameters are out of range.  
 
The lack of full applicability could be compensated by 
following an amalgamation approach as described in 
[10] and substitute e.g. certain parametric estimates 
with dedicated analogy or bottom-up estimates on S/S 
or unit level, or by performing ‘benchmarking’ [11] 
and taking and combing cost references from different 
other missions where some elements are similar in one, 
and some elements are similar in another mission (or 
system). In the end the decision has to be made if the 
available support tools are fully or partly applicable, if 
they can be made applicable or not. If the latter is the 
case, then do not use it. 
Specific / ROM cost (#4) 
CE-studies could be hectic events from time to time. 
The fact that you can hardly compensate with working 
over-hours, given the short and intense study phase, 
may lead to too quick and hence too dirty assessments. 
For example, in order to have an initial feeling (and 
subsequently a first response to the customer or the 
study team) on the overall cost, the cost estimator 
could do a quick ROM cost assessment using a simple 
analogy estimate or specific cost factors from 
literature, such as cost per S/C mass (e.g. k€/kg).  
However, due to lack of time, data clarity, 
understanding or precision, you could simply have a 
wrong interpretation of the factor which you identified 
or have been given. 
 
Specific costs are often not equipped with a Fiscal 
Year, which should be carefully considered if the 
developed/found value is old. More important are the 
correct assumptions for the mass and cost contributors.  
Table 1: Specific cost interpretation options 
Specific cost 
options [k€/kg],  
(FY 2020) 
S/C bus cost 
[k€] 
Project cost 
[k€] 
50,000 100,000 
S/C dry 
mass [kg] 
250 200 400 
S/C launch 
mass [kg] 
350 143 286 
 
If they are unclear, following situation could occur: 
Imagine a mission with a S/C dry mass of 250 kg and 
launch mass of 350 kg, with a cost of 50 M€ for the 
S/C itself and 100 M€ for the entire project lifecycle 
(incl. launch and operations), stated in FY2020, 
constant year million euros. In case it is not completely 
clear what the specific cost value in k€/kg is referring 
to, this can lead to significant differences up to a factor 
of 2.8 in our example (i.e. 400/143), as can be seen in 
Table 1. Additionally, the term S/C is sometimes uses 
for the service segment (bus) only, but sometimes 
including payload. So make sure what values to take 
and at least equally important, that this is something to 
be explained in front of the entire study team. And if 
someone else is arguing during the study that she/he 
has other values in mind, first the correct interpretation 
of this ‘initial-quick-look reference’ number has to be 
agreed on. 
Use of margins and contingencies (#5) 
During early stage design, there is still a lot of 
uncertainty carried along and therefore, a proper 
margin and contingency philosophy has to be applied. 
There are several standards and guidelines, e.g. [12], 
on how to apply them on technical as well as on cost-
related parameter. 
In CE-studies there is an interdisciplinary and multi-
cultural team (as for most projects in general) which 
has been called in to support the present study and is 
not necessarily used to work together. This means the 
systems engineer and team leader have to make sure 
that everyone has the same understanding and basis for 
the application of contingencies and margins to avoid 
double-counting or forgetting them, or piling them up 
in an unfortunate way, as shown e.g. in [13].  
Furthermore, for using the technical parameters and 
requirements as input for parametric cost models it has 
to be clear what values to take exactly. When using for 
instance mass-based CERs there is in principal three 
major options.  
 
Table 2 shows a mass budget on subsystem level for a 
small satellite, where the S/S masses are the sum of 
their actual equipment, with and without margins 
applied based on the ESA CDF margin philosophy 
[12]. From these options, listed in the following, it has 
to be decided which value should be used: 
(1) S/S mass (as sum of the equipment masses) without 
any margin, i.e. best guess only, shown in the 2nd 
column from the left, 
(2) S/S mass with design maturity margins (DMM), 
displayed in the 4th column from the left, 
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(3) S/S mass with DMM and the system margin portion 
on top, i.e. the values from the 4th column plus in 
this case 20% on each S/S. 
Table 2: Mass Budget example (S/S view) of a Satellite, 
incl. 3 potential options for mass values to be used in 
parametric cost estimation tools  
 
 
Since the tools and CERs are primarily based on actual 
data, and due to the tendency of mass growth and 
eating up margins during the development process, it is 
recommended to use in the above case option (3), i.e. 
the S/S mass including DMM and the system margin 
portion on top, or – if not possible or desired – to use 
option (2) and clearly reflect the additional uncertainty 
in the cost-risk analysis or at least within the 
documentation of results.  
Depending on the data model used for the CE-study (or 
project in general) the S/S mass values may need to be 
recalculated at some stage, e.g. with factor 1.2 in our 
case. This means that the Thermal S/S mass to be taken 
for the CER/Model is not 10kg, nor 12 kg but 14.4 kg. 
Please see also problem area #9 (rapid data changes) 
for further discussions on data model value utilization. 
 
During the tool selection process which should take 
place prior to the actual study phase, the use and 
application of technical margins not only for mass but 
also for other parameter should be clear, documented 
and preferably also agreed on. During the rapid and 
iterative estimation loops within the CE-environment 
these details may be overlooked. 
Heritage & Complexity (#6) 
As for any other study or project, the cost estimation 
has to take into account factors for heritage and 
complexity adjustments. Particularly for parametric 
estimates which are based primarily on CERs with 
mass as independent variable, the results would not 
capture how much of the design and test effort and 
models could be saved (or are needed in addition) due 
to heritage, nor how complex either the design, 
assembly and integration or control of the space system 
could be. In an early phase CE-study, the team has 
likely an understanding if they design something new 
or a derivation of an existing system, and if this is a 
rather simple or complex solution, but for the cost 
estimate the question remains, how strong this would 
affect the results. Some CERs and some tools account 
for one of both factors already; some do not consider 
them at all. Moreover, there are big differences on how 
heritage and complexity are addressed within these 
tools.  
The estimator has to make sure if the tools (or CERs, 
sophisticated models), or the approach and data for an 
analogy estimate account for this already, or if these 
factors have to be applied on top of the given 
outcomes. The key assumptions for the SSCM14 for 
example state an ‘average’ amount of heritage and an 
‘average’ level of technological complexity, stressing 
the fact that a proper cost-risk assessment is required 
[9]. Alternatively, a certain percentage, linear or 
exponential factor could be used, as done within/by 
several CERs, but this has to be selected and defined 
with care, since these factors, e.g. for heritage, can vary 
from less than 1.3 to more than 2.5 when comparing an 
‘average’ heritage (e.g. 50%) to a completely new 
development. Same is true for the similarly subjective 
complexity assessment. 
However, this adjustment, either manually or as a part 
of an e.g. parametric tool, should be factored in at the 
very end of the study, when most technical data is 
available. During the CE-study itself, in most cases, the 
team or at least systems engineer will strive for highest 
possible heritage and lowest complexity. Keep an eye 
on it, try to support the discussions and trades along the 
way, but work this out in detail as late as possible.  
If possible, this exercise should be done on S/S-level to 
reflect a potential high or low re-use and complexity 
per S/S of the space system, compared to others. 
Lack of time (#7) 
This is a major, self-explaining issue, partly also a self-
made one for the DLR CE-approach and institutions 
with similarly dense study timelines. Although this 
approach is clearly very efficient, the absolute time for 
analysis and potential re-work is short. 
First, within one week plus maybe some days before 
and afterwards including preparation and conclusion 
respectively, one cannot perform the complete cost 
estimation process as stated e.g. in the NASA cost 
estimation handbook [8] in full detail, simply due to 
the lack of resources and the early stage of most 
studies. 
The lack of time is a central reason for potential cost 
estimation errors or incompletion. It is critical for all 
domains, but the cost domain is heavily dependent on 
the outputs from others, to be used as input for own 
analyses, and hence is rather busy at the later stage 
during the design iterations. 
 
Therefore it is imperative to use a tool, calculation 
CER, or template you are really familiar with; there 
won’t be much time for experimenting. Implementing a 
proper process and adapting the tools for it, 
standardizing them and connecting them to a data base 
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could turn the problem into an opportunity and enable a 
very efficient design process and cost estimate, as it is 
the case e.g. for NASA team-X studies where “costing 
at the speed of light” [5] is commonly performed. 
Lack of data (#8) 
Cost estimation relies heavily on data. This includes 
technical data to establish the technical baseline for an 
estimate, as well as cost data from previous missions, 
designs or equipment selected. Often you lack both, 
due to the lack of technical maturity of the present 
mission/system, especially in the beginning of the 
study, and also due to the lack of comparability to 
former missions or simply lack of access to previous 
data. Unfortunately, in Europe for instance, there is no 
such databases available as CADRe or ONCE [14] in 
the U.S. 
This is again one of the reasons why parametric tools 
with a few technical input parameters are essential and 
of great help during this early stage of mission design. 
CERs and the tools making use of them (if available 
and applicable) contain already a large set of data 
points which do not have to be researched again. 
In case there is technological or operational differences 
apparent between the CERs used and the spacecraft for 
instance, effort shall be made to replace or adjust the 
cost of particular subsystems which differ most by 
using e.g. ‘benchmarks’ from other  subsystems of 
more suitable space missions where cost may be 
known, as also proposed in [11] (see also #3).  
At least the unknowns have to be known, and clearly 
documented in any case. 
Rapid data changes (#9) 
Concurrent Engineering and its highly iterative nature 
involving every discipline early on in the project is a 
big advantage. However, the rapid evolution of data 
leads to a couple of challenges.  
During one week, the total launch mass may change 
dramatically after each session. Assuming a 
requirement for a small sat mission with maximum of 
300 kg launch mass, at the end of day one, with an 
initial version of the product tree, the mass budget will 
tell you 225 kg. However, not everyone adds the 
relevant data into the data model in the beginning, so 
one may assume that the structural mass is missing 
entirely, harness is not yet considered, and propellant is 
fully unknown. In the course of the 2nd day, subject 
matter experts close the gaps, discuss and re-iterate 
with comfortable contingencies which leads to a total 
launch mass of 410 kg. During the 3rd day the team 
identifies that P/L and the S/C bus both included an 
optical bench and Star Tracker into the budgets, the 
operational modes are pre-defined as such that the data 
downlink and the science measurements do not take 
place at the same time, and that we do not need an X-
band system anymore. This leads to an updated launch 
mass of 340 kg. The 4th day is the day of refinement; 
the amount of data needed as input for an e.g. 
parametric model is also complete, and the total launch 
mass is now 290 and hence closely complies with the 
requirement.  
 
Figure 6: Example of mass variations over time during 
different revisions/iterations of a CE-study, taken out of 
the data model history, incl. explanations 
However, on the last day, someone figures out that the 
redundancy scheme for the avionics is not in-line with 
the single-failure-tolerant requirement for this e.g. 
(hopefully under) 50-60 M€ mission and now the mass 
increases, including margins, up to 320 again, which 
will likely not be a show stopper at this stage. An 
example of these changes, with other values, is shown 
in Figure 6. In order to constantly build up and update 
the cost estimate, e.g. using amongst others the Small 
Satellite Cost Model for this mass range, and to 
continue supporting properly some design trades taking 
into account the cost increase/decrease effects, the cost 
model has to be able to be updated easily without 
mixing up numbers or forgetting something. 
 
As for many problems, preparation is also the key here. 
The cost estimator needs a good understanding of the 
potential cost drivers already prior to the study, make 
first and robust assumptions for the technical baseline, 
and perform initial sensitivity analyses. Furthermore, 
the selected tools should be usable for such a series of 
iterations. As an example, Figure 7 shows the SSCM 
14, where an input sheet has been modified to do so. 
On the left, there is the original tool input section 
whereas on the top right the technical parameter values 
are checked if they are in the applicable range or not. 
Manually added there is a box on the lower right side, 
in which the mass budget on S/S level can directly be 
taken from the CEF data model. 
 
 
Figure 7: Screenshot of an adapted SSCM14 input sheet 
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The S/S masses are converted to mass with DMM and 
system margin portion (as discussed in #5) and then 
linked to the left input table. Moreover, the system 
masses (dry, wet, launch) are organized as such that a 
quick comparison with the actual mass budget can be 
made easily to identify gaps or overlapping.  
 
It would be even better, however, if such adaptation 
effort would not be necessary, but unfortunately most 
cost tools or calculations are difficult or inconvenient 
to connect to the central, multi-accessible data model, 
and vice versa. This brings us to the next reason why a 
cost estimate in a CE environment could go wrong: 
Disconnection to central data model (#10)  
Using a central data model, which acts as a single 
source of truth is great. It can be used in any project, 
but a CE-study is a good event for which the data 
model could be initiated or initially be prepared for. In 
principle there is nothing negative only positive: a bit 
of consistency is better than no consistency, thus we 
are talking about a luxury problem. The cost domain is 
not really included in the data model. This is also true 
in many cases for domains which use powerful 
commercial software, such as CAD-tools (e.g. CATIA) 
or orbital simulations tools (e.g. STK – System 
Toolkit). There are attempts to interface these tools to 
the central data model but this is not very common yet.  
 
For the cost estimator this means that an effort could be 
made to somehow link her/his estimation templates 
(e.g. spreadsheets), CERs, or own database to such a 
model, if confidentiality or other non-technical aspects 
allow for this. Since rapid data changes occur (see #9), 
it is mandatory to make robust, well forecasted 
assumptions for premature technical input data, keep 
an eye on the data model results, and organize the 
relevant model outputs which are of interest for the 
cost estimation as good and efficient as possible. Cost 
engineering as part of Model-based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE) is definitely an underestimated 
topic which provides a lot of material for further 
research.  
 
Figure 4 presented earlier displayed the GUI for the 
Virtual Satellite  central data model used DLR. It is an 
eclipse-based, open source tool enabling multiple-
access (with role management), using Subversion 
(SVN) for version control. It includes features such as 
a product tree, prepared mass budgets, power budgets 
and modes, a preliminary distributed CAD 
functionality, functional diagrams, a calculation mask 
and an Excel interface, but no dedicated cost estimation 
feature. This is just one example indicating that the 
concept of cost estimation has not yet fully arrived in 
the MBSE world. 
 
DLR is working on this topic and welcomes any other 
activities going into the same direction which seems to 
be the case looking at the presentation list of the 
ICEAA 2020 workshop [15]. 
Bottom-up estimates during a CE-Study (#11)  
CE-Studies are most suitable for Phase 0/A studies, as 
mentioned already. This means that the primary cost 
estimation methodologies are parametric or base on 
analogies.  
However, similar space missions or systems are barely 
available, either because something comparable has 
never been designed or the data is simply not available, 
which makes analogy assessment sometimes difficult. 
The parametric approach on the other hand is not well 
understood by many engineers and sometimes not even 
accepted (see also #1 and #13). This is particularly true 
if a tool or CER is used which does not really reflect 
the way of computing cost for a certain type of mission 
or for a certain institution or culture. Hence a lot of 
effort is spend to defend the methodology selection and 
respective results (with or without adjustment to 
account for the “differences”), instead of detailing and 
improving the estimate itself. 
 
Besides the managers or customers who want a super-
detailed WBS-based cost estimate already in a Phase 0 
study although it is still not even clear if for instance a 
Propulsion system is needed or not (again, see #1), 
many engineers tend to feel more comfortable 
discussing materials and labour cost than to trust a 
number which is spit out of a parametric tool. The 
power of parametrics, especially for trade studies 
where you could easily assess the impact of using e.g. 
Star Trackers or not, or to what extend the pointing 
accuracy affects the cost, is not always understood. 
Sitting face-to-face within an office may lead to a 
discussion on eye-level but with 15 people next to you 
who are not familiar with such things as CERs, this is 
challenging.  
 
Consequently, during many CE-studies a preliminary 
bottom-up estimate has been made. The advantage is 
that the estimate makes use of the engineer’s 
experience in terms of materials and labour cost. 
However, the former may not be properly linked to the 
model philosophies, test and ground equipment. 
Especially the spacecraft operation is often drastically 
under or overestimated, which is due to the short time 
available and the pressure to continue iterating rather 
on the technical numbers. In summary, within a CE-
environment following a more condensed approach of 
days instead of weeks, the disadvantage of bottom-up 
estimates in early phases becomes very apparent.  
 
One lessons learnt is to have – based e.g. on parametric 
studies – a rough cost distribution per S/S at hand, and 
a preliminary assessment of how much additional effort 
is needed for system wraps such as management or 
product assurance. It could be decided on a case by 
case basis if the domain experts should be confronted 
with these historical and average values to get an idea 
on the ballpark values for their more detailed cost 
contributions, or not. If specific cost factors (e.g. in 
k€/kg) are available and well understood (see #4), they 
are helpful for sanity checks, too. 
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Moreover, for a bottom-up estimate there has to be a 
common approach and set of assumptions amongst all 
contributors, which include the subject matter experts, 
and maybe their superiors. It makes a huge differences 
if someone tends to provide a very conservative 
number to already claim a certain budget and to 
prepare future negotiations, or if someone does rather 
the opposite and estimates at the lower end and with 
realistic cost distributions over time, to ensure that the 
project is more likely to be funded. If bottom-up 
estimates are really necessary or desired, the cost 
breakdown needs to be clear to everyone (see also #1). 
Optimizing in the wrong place (#12) 
A space mission consists of different segment, such as 
the space system (including bus and payload), the 
launch vehicle and the ground segment including 
operations. 
Most CERs and tools are available for the space 
system, some with, some without payload. Moreover, 
the majority of CE-study team members represent S/C 
subsystems. This might support a more detailed cost 
estimate on S/C bus level, no matter which estimation 
methodology is applied, compared to the other 
segments. There is also holistic tools out there, such as 
the parametric QuickCost tool developed by Hamaker. 
The S/C bus and payload cost in version 6 of this tool 
[16] are estimated using CERs, launch cost are entered 
directly (if desired) while all other NASA WBS 
elements are covered by adding different percentages 
on the sum of the S/C bus and P/L cost. Using the 
average values as shown in [16], the space segment is 
dominating the total project cost with approx. 60-80% 
in this ‘average’ case, depending on the launch cost. 
However, especially for long-duration science and 
exploration missions, the operations cost can 
significantly increase. But this can also be the case for 
more regular Earth Observation missions if standard 
components are used, low complexity and a strong 
heritage approach is followed. 
 
The key message is that while detailing one part of the 
project life-cycle cost it could be easily underestimated 
that there is significant cost, or uncertainties or both 
associated to other parts, too. 
 
Focus should be set on the cost drivers, discussions on 
100 k$ could be saved for later, and a rough mission 
cost breakdown has to be prepared based on the most 
suitable references and most driving requirements 
which could be found. With respect to CERs 
potentially used, the sensitivity and slopes need to be 
known in order to know better on what updated values 
to focus and where the estimate can “survive” with a 
more rough assumptions (since the cost differences 
may not be significant). 
Lack of acceptance or perceived relevance (#13) 
As indicated already a few times, the non-technical 
participants of early space mission studies are the 
absolute minority. Focus is set on the science case and 
technical feasibility, what is understandable.  
However, without an initial assessment on the cost, no 
statement regarding a potential implementation of this 
mission can be made.  
 
Note that studies regarding commercial systems, e.g. 
for a new geostationary communication satellite, are of 
course an exception, since they do not only include the 
cost but also business model considerations. On the 
other hand, commercial missions usually do not require 
pre-Phase A analysis, since there is likely a reference 
platform and the mission-related aspects are 
comparably simple. 
 
Models and design processes amongst engineers are 
understood, even if one does not exactly knows how to 
design another subsystem for example. An electrical 
engineer developing a power system has an idea of the 
steps necessary to come up with an on-board computer 
sizing, and should also be able to properly assess the 
risk and potential mitigation strategies. She/he also 
might have some cost numbers at hand and can provide 
an estimate of the required labour throughout the 
development (with a very big uncertainty for fancy 
missions analyzed in a very early phase), but if things 
like confidence levels or fiscal year enter the game, 
engineers often cannot or do not want to understand 
why this is even important, or do not even pay attention 
until the final magic number is shown. 
 
Additionally, the cost estimate presented is subject to 
intensive discussion (much more than the maximum 
power demand during an orbit raising maneuver), and 
there is sometimes the tendency – rather from 
management than subject matter expert side – to 
quickly re-assess the cost on a napkin with the aim to 
show that the estimate is too high.  
 
Having in mind that most of the described problem 
areas in this paper are also applicable to the other team 
members, there simply might not be the time left to talk 
extensively to them for proper cost and cost-risk 
assessments, since they need (or want) to focus on their 
design tasks.    
 
However, as for many other things, it is important to 
properly explain all assumptions, processes and steps 
to make them transparent. Since it is one of the 
strengths of the CE-methodology, educating others to 
make aware that a decision made by someone affects 
the design of someone else is imperative.  
 
In the course of a mission selection campaign at DLR, 
several 3-day CE-studies have been conducted, with 
the aim to investigate missions and science cases to be 
realized with a small satellite. In the final presentation 
session, cost is usually one of the last talks (maybe this 
should be changed one day). Maybe due to the above 
discussed aspects or the fact that long days were behind 
the team, almost no one paid attention. For one of the 
later designed missions, a lessons learnt was to shock 
them a bit, with extreme simplified (i.e. very easy to 
digest) content and the maximum possible cost which 
had been assessed. 
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Figure 8: Set of concluding cost slides presented at the 
end of a recent DLR CE-study, which raised a lot of 
attention before the actual content was shown 
 
Figure 8 shows the three slides which were presented 
as a first shot, before the joke was confessed and the 
proper presentation was held. As a result, everyone was 
awake, was paying attention and well understood how 
the numbers were identified, adjusted and how they 
could be compared with the other missions. 
 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
Concurrent Engineering is a very efficient approach 
well suitable for early phase studies in the space 
domain. It reduces time, cost and risks while increasing 
quality and mutual understanding. However, it is not 
perfect and also has some dark sides as discussed in 
[17], depending on the implementation and application. 
 
The presented work discusses 13 problem areas and 
reasons why a cost estimate which is performed in a 
CE-environment could go wrong, with a focus on the 
DLR approach to Concurrent Engineering. 
 
As stated, these reasons are not exclusively limited to 
the cost domain or even CE, but partly also for early 
phase projects and collaborative efforts in general, and 
they are also not self-standing but closely linked to 
each other. Moreover the list is not exhaustive at all. 
Mutual influences 
As indicated within the previous subchapters, most of 
these reasons are linked, mutually influenced and even 
dependent on each other. Some are more CE-specific; 
some apply to the cost engineering process basically 
within all projects. Some are more DLR-specific, some 
relate to all similar processes. 
The mutual influences presented in Figure 9 are an 
attempt to highlight what are the most dominant 
reasons which potentially could create or amplify other 
reasons why cost estimation in a CE-study could go 
wrong. The more connections, the stronger might be 
the direct influence on other factors. However, this 
does not relate to the actual impact on the cost estimate 
but shall indicate what should be kept in mind first in 
order to maintain full control over the cost estimate 
performed during a CE-study. 
 
 
Figure 9: Mutual influences of discussed problem areas 
 
Lessons learnt 
Derived from the discussions with respect to the 13 
problem areas, a set of general and summarized lessons 
learnt is compiled in the following. It focused on four 
main categories, which are: Awareness, Preparation, 
Communication and Documentation.  
These categories are further broken down into 12 plus 
one ‘bonus’ recommendations to fight against the 13 
problem areas.  
 
Awareness 
a) Check who is involved 
b) Understand potential problems, prioritize 
c) Accept to make compromises, be flexible 
 
Preparation 
d) Check all available data, tools, methods 
e) Adjust, to be fast 
f) Tailor, to be in-line with expectations 
 
Communication 
g) Clarify & harmonize inconsistencies, assumptions 
h) Explain what you want and can do 
i) Educate how you do things, shake team if needed 
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Documentation 
j) Agree on what has been discussed, by consensus 
k) Make transparent what you assume and provide 
l) Try to connect cost data to common data set/model 
 
One promising approach to address several of the 
above mentioned aspects is to use a top-level all-in-one 
tool, such as the “S-chart” used at NASA JPL for rapid, 
comprehensive mission architecting [18] at Team-X, 
which is shown here in Figure 10.  
 
It aims to provide a simultaneous view of all major 
mission considerations, such as the programmatic 
constraints, technical performances, capabilities and 
margins, science performances, high-level system 
descriptions and also cost. This tool, or something 
along those lines, can be permanently displayed in the 
CE-environment to keep everyone informed about the 
latest status. If this is already embedded within a 
central data model, this would be even better. 
 
 
Figure 10: S-chart used at NASA JPL for Rapid Mission 
Architecting, here on Segment level [18] 
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